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THE NATURE AND MOTIVATING POWER OF THE IDEAL

BY

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A.B. WHITTIER COLLEGE, 1931

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

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

This thesis is born out of a desire to establish the nature of ideals from the standpoint of an educator, and to determine to what extent and under what conditions these ideals motivate conduct. The philosophy of education in this country is so strongly influenced by the pragmatic point of view in psychology that it is necessary for anyone holding the idealistic point of view to substantiate his point of view with all available facts. To do this is will be necessary to study the physical, the psychological and environmental phases of experience and show what each contributes toward the formation and development of ideals. I hope, too, that this study may give sufficient insight into the factors conditioning the origin and growth of ideals that we may come to some basic conclusions regarding methods of making ideals most effective in conduct.

That, in brief, is the problem to be solved.

Education has never given very much attention to the ideal and its power as a motive force. As a matter of fact the subject of ideals has been largely confined to philosophical speculation. It is the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate their importance in the development of ethical conduct, and to point out some ways in which educators may control this motivating power and use it to further the ends of character development.

Approach to the Problem

Religious educators have assumed, particularly in recent years since the psychology of fear has fallen into disrepute, that ideals do influence conduct. I will proceed upon this hypothesis, not as established truth closed to controversy, but as a subject worthy of investigation. It is my hope that the facts thus brought our may answer the question of whether they do or not, or, if the question cannot be answered by yes or no, to reveal under what circumstances they can, and under what conditions no direct results can be expected.

While I am neither blind to the great contribution philosophy has made to the field of ideals, nor oblivious of the pageant upon the stage of history which the varying religious standards and ideals have played, I shall have to omit practically all discussion of this phase of the subject. The only explanation in this respect that I need to make clear is that I accept the ideals of Jesus as the highest ever given to the human race, and that throughout this paper they will be referred to as standard.

CHAPTER II

Definition of the Ideal

In the fields of philosophy and religion we find some well established schools of idealistic thought. Philosophical idealism holds that ideals and values are not merely human standards and human experiences, but that they reveal the objective structure or, perhaps, the conscious purpose, of the universe, just as human sense experience and human standards of scientific method reveal the laws of nature[1]. All these "idealists" hold that goodness and truth and beauty are imperative ideals for the universe independent of man as well as for man, and that when man is seeking to realize them, he is working toward the very goals for which the universe is striving[2]. This idea puts the universe on the side of man's deepest and best desires. Such a conception finds its foundation in the genuine conviction that the universe throughout is the work or the embodiment of reason or mind.[3]

In almost direct opposition is the naturalistic view, which asserts all mental and moral

processes to be reduced to the terms and categories of the natural sciences. It holds that, apart from man, nature is indifferent to ideals, and human ideals, although good for man, are purely human products in a universe which itself is both impersonal and without concern for ideals or their realization.[4]

Religious idealism holds that life is organized around some spiritual Being, and faith in God attests to the fact that the highest ideal is considered, among the more advanced religions in which we are interested, to be omnipotent and unchanging, and religious enthusiasts claim that devotion to this ideal is all of life.

While the importance of these schools of thought are not to be minimized in their effect on a person's world view, they give us only an idea of what the place of ideals may be considered to be in the universe; they do not define them. This is important, and I will show its significance later, but since it is the purpose of this paper to determine whether ideals have the intrinsic power to motivate conduct or not, it is necessary to make clear exactly what is meant by ideals.

There has been a notable effort on the part of educators, religious and secular, and phil-

osophers recently to clear the haze which surrounds ideals, and establish a definite conception of what is meant by the term. As a result we have some very suggestive definitions.

Professor John Wright Buckham defines the ideal as "an obligatory image each person has of what he may become in himself and do for his fellow men." In this he assumes

1. that every person has ideals,
2. that an ideal is an image, a particular concept,
3. that it is obligatory in nature; it binds one to act,
4. that it takes two forms, personal and social.

Another definition was formulated by a committee on Education for Citizenship, appointed by Dean James E. Russell from the faculty of Teacher's College[5] which is as follows:

> "An ideal is probably best thought of as consisting of a generalized notion or general concept used as a plan or standard of action, Second,it may be considered as consisting of the recognition and appreciation of the practical worth of this plan or standard,and third, a tendency (habit) to accept and obey the plan or standard to act it out in conduct. Unless these three elements are present we cannot properly employ the term ideal." 6

Still another definition is offered by W. D. Niven in Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics[7]. He believes the ideal to be a "conception of what, if attained would fully satisfy; of what is perfect of its kind, and, in consequence, is the

pattern to be copied, and the standard by which actual achievement is judged."

Professor Brightman, after taking all of these into consideration, except Professor Buckham's, synthesizes them, and has the following result:

> "An ideal is a general concept of a type of experience which we approve in relation to a complete view of all our experience, including all our approvals." 3

He assumes with Professor Buckham

1. that "we", all persons, have ideals, but he
2. considers that an ideal is general rather than particular,
3. that to be ideal a general concept must be approved, and
4. that it must be an idea in accordance with our complete experience.

In an attempt to make clear in just what sense I will use the term "ideals" in this study, I have chosen the following ideas brought out in the definitions quoted. From them I hope to formulate one expressing what the ideal <u>is</u> more satisfactorily than any one of these does alone.

1. The ideal is an image, hazy in some cases, but particular rather than general. As an illustration of what I mean by "general" take the concept of an honest man in contrast to a particular image of myself returning money that was given to me in change by mistake.
2. Every person has ideals.
3. Ideals may take either personal or social aspects. That is I may have an image of myself as wealthy and comfortable, or I may have an image of <u>all</u> men as respect-

ably clothed and housed, thinking of myself only as one of them.
4. The ideal is a standard by which to judge achievement.
5. The ideal has some kind of compelling power. I cannot call it obligatory as that implies that one is bound by duty to something or someone outside himself, but rather compelling as that implies that it is a driving force within ones self. This latter view is substantiated by psychology, and does not contradict the philosophical conception of intrinsic good.
6. The ideal is an image of what one might become or might do.
7. The ideal is of some recognized worth.

I object to calling ideals generalized concepts as I can find no adequate meaning of the word "concept", and ideals as I am to consider them are not general, but particular and definite. They do not necessarily result in action, for, if they did, there would be no problem. Neither do they, when attained, always result in satisfaction, for people do not always attach worth to the things that result in permanent satisfaction, but sometimes mistake temporary or fleeting satisfactions for constant ones. In some cases they would be in relation to a complete view of all experiences, including all approvals and in some cases we will see that they will not be, so that cannot be included in this particular definition.

I wish to use Professor Buckham's definition as a foundation, for I think he has struck the fundamental notes of the problem in it, but I wish

to add some phases which seem very pertinent.

Thus altered it would read:

> The ideal is a compelling image each person has of what he may become in himself and do for his fellow men, which he approves as admirable and of recognized worth.

When he summed up the implications of his definition of the ideal, Mr. Brightman male five observations:

1. An ideal is visible only to thought. It cannot be perceived in sense experience.
2. It is a general concept of a type of experience; it may be regarded as implying an hypothesis about future experience.
3. It is a principle of unity.
4. It is a principle of control and selection.
5. It is a plan of action.

The same may be said of my definition, and I would add that it is an urge to action as well as a plan of action. If that is omited something of the vital, the vibrant quality peculiar to ideals is lost. I should replace the term "general concept" with the word "image", signifying by that that it is not the recognition of sensory experience in ideational form, but involves rather an aporeciation of its meaning.

Revised in the light of these suggestions a summary of the implications of this definition would read as follows:

An ideal is

1. visiblie only to thought; it cannot be perceived in sense experience alone;
2. an image of a specific experience; it may be regarded as implying an hypothesis about future experience;
3. a principle of unity;
4. a principle of control and selection, and finally
5. a plan of action and a spur to action.

CHAPTER III

THE ULTIMATE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDEALS

While the definition of the ideal just given makes it clear just what is to be implied when the term is used, it does not give any indication of its significance. It is the purpose of this chapter to inhance its meaning.

If an ideal is visible only to thought, it would seem reasonable to assume that it would not exist for the individual until his thought processes had reached a stage of development that would permit him to intellectually grasp an ideal image. This raises the question of whether an ideal exists at all until a man has a mental image of it. I have never been able to agree with those who maintain that reality exists only in consciousness. It seems an undeniable fact to me that the universe existed long before astronomers began to study the stars and compute the laws regulating their course through space; that the essential laws of harmony existed long before an artist visualized them in his mind and put them on canvas; that the values such as love were spiritual realities ages before human minds and hearts ever touched them. In other words

there is an ultimate standard that exists whether we are ever able to grasp it or not.

It is common for people to have an ideal image of some one portion of this ultimate truth, the amount and extent and quality of which is determined by the individual and what have been the circumstances of his development. As a consequence ideals in regard to the same principle or thing differ, and it is common for us to say, "Well, that may be true for him, but it is not true for me." This hardly seems valid. When a long multiplication sum is given out to a class of thirty small boys, the answers will probably differ. But the whole form will agree that the diverse answers cannot all be right. It never occurs to the most skeptical of small boys to say to the master: "No doubt the answer is three-hundred and thirty-six for you and the book, but for me these figures make three-hundred and thirty-seven.[10] It is doubtful whether anyone ever sees the imperical ideal in any category in its universal entirety, but that does not prove that it does not exist.

If we cannot expect to see the ideal in its entirety, what is to be the criterion by which to test its value?

I am assuming throughout this thesis that personality is the ultimate human value. Jesus accepted it as such, and nothing that I have been able to observe has eclipsed his conception. The ultimate criterion of value, then, is measured as it affects the development of the largest number of personalities. No one person can estimate the whole good for the largest number of personalities, any more than they can conceive of the ideal in its universal aspect. This makes it necessary for each person to accept his image of a specific experience which is the ideal for him as nearly as he can see it, and evaluate it in the light of the largest number of personalities he knows. We understand that we cannot see the road all the way from here to Los Angeles, but if we wish to go there we proceed along as far as we can see. The analysis hold good in the pursuit of the ideal in its full significance. Once we work toward it it opens new and fuller revelations and we gain a more universal and broad view as we go on.

In so far as the ethical ideal affects the individual person it should make for this thing we call character. And by character we mean moral; that is with a sense of right and wrong and strength to choose the right in the face of the wrong. We mean

unity, dependability and consistency. There is such a thing as character really true to nature...ringing true to our best sense, and there is also such a thing as imposed character which is apt to fail in emergency,[11] but what the ethical ideal should cultivate is a character consistent with the best good it knows and one always to be depended upon to act in accordance with that good when a choice is involved. By character we also mean expanding, developing, groping. To grow and expand means a reaching out, a taking hold of ideas on faith as the tendril of a grape vine reaches out toward something to which to cling and draw itself up. Such faith requires belief in a God of Eternal Values...something worth holding to once we have found it. It is accompanied by awe and reverence for the things we cannot understand in contrast to fear and stubborness in the face of all new movements and ideas.

The character acting in accordance with the ethical ideal will be social in its aspect as well as personal. We have already noted that the ideal gets its universal significance through the criterion of the greatest good to the greatest number of personalities. I will illustrate later how closely the development of personality is bound up with the relation of one person to another; it suffices here

to say that without the joys, and the conflicts and the sorrows connected with human relationships, ethical ideals would not exist for the individual at all. They depend upon the inter-relation of individuals to stimulate the reaching out toward something good. It is in our attempt to made peace out of chaos that we get a vision of an ideal of harmony.

An ethical ideal, then, is not something that has significance for the person who holds it alone, but must be good for other persons before it can be in the class of the universal standard at all.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IDEALS

Having determined what the ideal is, and continuing with the hypothesis that ideals do exist and that they do find expression in conduct, the next step is to find the source of ideals, the circumstances that accompany their development, and under what conditions they result in action.

A recent issue of "Character" published an article entitled "Divorced: Ideals and Conduct",[12] in which the author calls attention to the fact that our actions fail miserably to square up with our ideals and purposes, that there is no consistency or dependability discernible in the conduct of the child and that one set of language or of habit responses exists for the home, another for the church, another with his gang, and another around school. If this is true, and probably even the less observant of us have noted some evidence to that effect, the first logical step would seem to be an investigation of the origin of the ideal, the next, as was mentioned above, to see in what kind of soil it sprouts and takes root. With this information we should be able to discern the cause for such a

discrepency.

Psychology would trace the ideal back to the idea, for an ideal is a specified type of idea; an idea that meets with approval. A recent article in the Personalist[13] attempts to discern whether images have any relation to sense experience and whether there is a special mechanism which functions as an image maker. It says:

> "The answer of the old psychology was that they (images) are a mosaic of individual sense impressions combined according to well defined laws of association. The answer of the new psychology is that they are shapes which the mind recognizes under the most diverse variations of sense experience. Whether the shape be original and the content derived, or whether the content be original and the shape the result of association, in either case for psychology, images are given. It can offer no account of their nature or origin.
>
> Neurology is in no better case. For the functioning of voluntary muscles there intervenes between the stimulus and the action an image. The neurologist can discover no special mechanism to which to assign the function of image-making, and, moreover, there is no obvious gap in the nervous arc to bridge which an image or something corresponding is required."

We cannot trace inferior ideals, then, to a diseased or poorly functioning "image maker" in the sensory mechanism as one traces certain reactions to an over active thyroid. The physical

organism makes only tow contributions to the formation of images: it contributes the vehicle and supplies the energy.[14] Beyond that it has no power, but without mind and without consciousness there can be no ideas.[15]

Psychologists are pretty generally agreed, I think, that mind is in close relation to body, coordinating with it to a marked degree. In Mr. Bentley's words:

> "So far as we know in history, mind has been closely bound up with life ....Upon considering the close relation between experience and the nervous system, the most highly integrative of all the bodily systems we have seen a reason for this indicatory aspect of mind. When we regard "life" as the onward, fluent, and mobile integration and re-balancing of all the metabolic processes, it seems to be natural that its general tenor as well as its vicissitudes should be reflected in the total functions of the central nervous system and therefore in mind." 16

Their functions are different, however, and ideation is one of the functions of mind, influenced only indirectly by the physical organism. This psychological conclusion verifies the first implication of the definition i.e. that ideals are visible only to though; they are not perceived in sense experience.

Assuming, then, that images are "given"

providing conscious experience is present, in what form do we first recognize them?

Probably first through simple apprehension. A close study of this will reveal that the statement made above in regard to images and sense experience is certainly true, but it will also show just what part this sense experience does play in the formation of ideal images.

Professor Alexander says that man first became aware of concepts through sense experience. For instance the pound was first a lift, the foot rule the length of an ordinary man's foot.[17] Our ideas are born in the same manner through hearing, seeing, feeling, and because this is true the physical "vehicle" may color the idea. While in every case mind makes its contribution by providing reference or meaning[18] and a sense experience does not become an ideauntil mind gives it meaning, a blind man's idea of a table is necessarily different from that of a man who has the use of his eyes.

Apprehension is not confined to conscious sense perception, however; language is a form of ideation, and even words themselves, may take the form of images.[19] In Japanese flower arrangements, I am told, certain lines might suggest a definite perceptual image as joy, aspiration, humility. The

same thing is true in dancing where certain postures and movements become symbolic and by that fact suggest images. To quote Robinson:[20]

> "To the degree to which these acts stand for something beyond themselves they are ideas."

To be an idea or an ideal, a perception must have significance.

The perspective and projection of ideas which inhances their meaning is made possible by two characteristics of mind; namely memory and imagination. An illustration will show their significance in the comprehension of images or ideas, and will reveal their close inter-relation to sense perception. I step into a room. I see tables, chairs and davenport piled in the center of the floor. The disorder irritates me. My mind goes back to a room I saw last week where the davenport was in front of the fire with a lamp beside it, the table was behind the davenport with a bowl of flowers on it. There was a large chair by a window, and a small table against the wall with a long hanging above it. I should like to see this room look like that one did, but it is a different shape, and the articles of furniture are different. In my imagination I place a piece of furniture here, then there in an attempt to make an arrangement with the most

pleasing effect. The resulting mental image, if it meets with my approval, is an ideal.

In concluding my remarks about the definition of the ideal I called attention to the fact that one of the characteristics of the ideal is its principle of unity, of control and selective agent. We remember distinctly two types of experiences; those which give us severe pain, and those which give us great pleasure. In between on the misty flats are any number of experiences which have significance only as they are related to familiar physical experiences or pleasing mental habits. We remember those things which lie along these familiar interests.[21] "A good memory", Robinson says, "depends upon a wise selection of what is worth memorizing."[22] When a careful selection is made of what is important to remember, then, memory comes to play the important role of selective agent.

The perspective memory gives also acts as a lever of control. Recalling situations and experiences of the past we direct our activities in accordance with them. Any outside stimuli, to be effective in action, would necessarily have to break down this inner control.

As a result of the selection and control memory makes possible, ideas should begin to take

on a general unity. If thy do not, I will attempt to show later some reasons why.

Imagination, the other vehicle of apprehension, makes it possible to evaluate an ideal in perspective, for imagination uses the images selected by memory, and tends to project them into the future in more or less unified order.

Let me emphasize that imagination uses only the images selected by memory; it is limited by what the individual has experienced. In the words of William James:[23]

> "Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism, so the copies of them arise again in the mind after the original outward stimulus is gone. No mental copy, however, can arise in the mind of any kind of sensation which has never been directly excited from without."
> The blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds, for years after they have lost their vision or hearing; but the man born deaf can never be made to imagine what sound is like, nor can the man born blind ever have a mental vision."

The function of imagination, then, is to combine these mental pictures, making new combinations, not to create new images as has sometimes been supposed.[24] To quote William James again:

> "When the mental pictures are of data freely combined, and reproducing no past combination exactly, we have acts of imagination so called".

This process of making new combinations of familiar images makes possible the highest types of reasoning. It illiminates the long, tiresome trial and error method to a large degree, by solving problems through mental association of images until a satisfactory combination has been made. It is an important factor in the highest type of reasoning recognized, that of solving problems by the aid of symbols. This latter field of mental activity is that which is constantly used by the poet, the religionist and the philosopher, and it is in this realm that ideals as they are to be considered in this paper are probably born.

This study of the idea and its origin clarifies the ideal image in its relation to mental functions, and now we are ready to consider how these ideals get into conduct experience. Professor Angell says:[25]

> "Normally the only reason any sensation or idea fails to elicit a movement is that there exists some blockage in the neurones or that there is competition with some stronger idea or sensation and it is overcome."

One part of our mechanism which may either act as a strong, compelling power for overcoming other contradictory elements or which may be one of the most serious blocks conceivable

in its movement to action, is feeling. The importance of this element is put plainly by David Robertson in an article in the Religious Education Magazine.[26]

> "Mind is the human being in action, and that action is startled by a wealth of factors about which we know comparatively little. Instincts and emotions of fear, anger, sadness, pleasure, with their kinfolk hatred, jealousy, sensitiveness, pessimism, self-pity, ambition, longings and cravings, of which we may not even be aware, constitute by far the most powerful drives of our behavior as individuals, and our behavior as crowds and groups. In fact, so subtle and effective are these emotional factors of our mental life that they can hypnotize our intellect into doing anything they wish. It has been said that our intellect seems to be used to find excuses for acting the way in which our instincts and emotions bid us."

These feelings are evasive things, and a haze hangs about them even when they are closely scrutinized and experimented with by the careful psychologist. They seem to be on the fringe of consciousness, never atthe focus. We are aware of them, yet if we turn our inward eye upon them and attempt to analyze them, they disappear over the margin.

Angell states quite clearly in just what way we become aware of them.[27]

> "When a stimulus falls upon a sense organ, it normally sets up a nervous excitation which is then transmitted into the central nervous system, whence

> it issues again as a muscular movement. But it is apt to occasion other consequences besides those thus described. It is likely immediately to produce either pleasurable or painful results...Secondarily the movement to which it gives rise may be followed by a subsequent group of sensations in their turn agreeable or disagreeable...Thus it comes about that from the very beginning sensory stimulations are for the most part not indifferent, but already come freighted with prejudices, favorable or unfavorable to their repetition."

There has never been an adequate description made of just what "feeling" is. We are forced to draw most of our conclusions about it from what we see it doing. It takes two simple forms, pleasantness andunpleasantness, in its least complex form [23] and all the varying forms of the emotions in the more complex state. In a very general statement we may say that unpleasant experiences may be taken as indications that the organism possessing them is in some way out of adjustment with his environment. [24]

Since one's environment varies from time to time...even many times during a day...it can readily be seen that a stimulus at one time might be pleasant and in keeping, and at another time unpleasant and out of keeping. For instance if one goes to hear music in an auditorium, the experience is probably pleasant, but if he hears the same music

in the same hall when he wishes to study for an important examination in the next room, his reaction is unpleasant. In just the same way the ethical ideal of "love your enemies" might call forth a pleasant reaction at the worship service in a beautiful chapel, but not at all an agreeable reception when one is making a victory verbal or physical, over an enemy who has excited you wrath. Anyone attempting to condition responses in connection with advocated ideals consistently runs up against this difficulty. The example only verifies Angell's conclusion that from the very beginning sensory stimulations are for the most part not indifferent, but already come freighted with prejudices, favorable or unfavorable, to their repetition.

At first glance this makes a very discouraging picture for the Sunday School teacher or club leader who attempts to present ideals that will influence the lives of his proteges. But we must remember that previous conditions are equally apt to enhance the motivation or compelling power of his ideal as it is to block or deter it, and this same feeling, once favorably aroused, is his most dependable agent for getting the ideal into action.

It has been a common doctrine and is one for which so eminent a psychologist as Wundt stands

sponsor, that voluntary actions always grow out of feelings, or, expresses other wise, that no volitional act ever occurs except in response to feeling. Either of two possible lines of conduct may be perfectly rational and entirely defensible, but for the one we feel a strong predilection and toward the other a powerful aversion. Our choice rests, in such cases, not upon the sheer rationality of the act, but upon our feeling regarding the alternatives. While there may be decisions which are entirely cold-blooded and intellectualistic, and while many of our acts are essentially habitual and carried out without any particular reflection, there can be no doubt that in great ranges of our conduct such a description is correct. In that the psychologically moving factor which determines us to choose one rather than another course of action is to be stated in terms of our subjective prejudices and feelings, rather than in terms of pure reason.[30]

Another factor to be seriously considered is that these feelings are not static; but are often amendable and changeable as experience grows and varies. I hope later to show how feeling can be trained and educated over a long period of time to bring about desirable results.

Adolph Meyer, in a magazine article not long ago summed up what he thought character should be:[31]

> "When we (psychiatrists) speak of character we loog for dependability, that is, orderliness...and for discipline.. which is the capacity to use guidance...and for a certain security and maturity."

We have been considering the qualities which tend to give choice and orderliness, now we turn to that characteristic of our make-up which makes for discipline...the will.

In this previous study of the origin and conditioning of the ideal before it is completed in conduct, it has become more and more clear what a very complex process this ideal-conduct relationship is. With so many factors playing upon a perceived idea, the work of the educator relgious and secular, would be haphazard at best if it were not for the saving factor of the will which focuses the attention on a specific idea and sometimes against feeling and inclination puts them into practice.

Will is another term almost impossible of definition and this is another case where we observe its significance through its effect on human conduct.

Many of our acts, of course, are involuntary or impulsive, many are habitual and more still are the result of unconscious imitation. But

these are not the ones we are concerned with here. Our problem has to do with ideals of conduct recognized by mind as new to the organism and of appreciable worth, and how to complete them in action.

The imagination was said to use the ideals memory had selected, and project them in a more or less unified way into the future. By looking into our own experience we can be sure that we have any number of ideals of possible conduct in the course of a few minutes. Sitting here I have the ideal of finishing this section of my paper before three o'clock. Almost immediately the idea of going out and getting something to eat presents itself, and crowding on top of that a thought of looking up a book I need to use in another course. All are ideals of action; all are legitimate and worhy ideals; it is the function of the will to act further as selective agent, focus the attention on one of these three, and furnish the compelling power which drives toward doing it.

In attempting to show what will does, an important point in regard to the condition under which it works is brought out. This circumstance is the necessity of choosing between ideas recognizable and conscious in our attention.

> "Conflict between the enterprising tendency to explore, manipulate or somehow launch forth into the new, and the negative tendencies of fear, inertia, shyness, etc., is something that recurs again and again in human experience, as illustrated by making up your mind to get up in the morning or to plunge into the cold water, or to speak up and have your say in a general conversation. There is a hesitancy in such cases due to a positive and a negative tendency...The positive motive must for an instant be stronger than the negative, in order to get action." 32

Thus writes Professor Woodworth, and he also points out that there are times when we see the better, but follow the worse...the worse usually being something that appeals to the 'old Adam' in us, something that strongly arouses a primitive instinctive response while the better is a nobler, more dutiful, or more prudent course. The lower motive being the stronger, how can it ever be that the higher motive gets the decision? Other motives are drawn into the fray, the whole man is drawn in, and it is a question which side is the stronger. Fear of ridicule is drawn in, or criticism, sense of duty, self-respect, ambition, ideals of oneself, concern for the welfare of another person, loyalty to a social group, may be ranged on the side of the "weaker" motive and give it the advantage over the "stronger".[33] In other words will is a function of the

organized self, and it is impelled by the strongest motive of any organism, namely the urge to completeness. Because of this organization of many instincts toward a definite purpose, will can win out over the fleeting, unorganized baser instincts.[34]

Ideally this sounds very encouraging, but why doesn't it always work? How is it that sometimes the will dominates and at other times we are carried away by our impulses and emotions?

Professor Hadfield believes first of all that the will is a function of the organized self.[35] If we have not organized our impulses about a purpose will loses its force. If a choice is simply a decision between two impulses will does not enter in, the stronger impulse simply wins out. Take the illustration of a man lying on the seashore who may have the impulse to bathe, and an impulse to continue being lazy. It is a matter of indifference to the "self" which he does as he is on a holiday. In such a case, when there is merely a conflict between impulses, it is always the stronger that wins: as the warmth of the sun is more "attractive" than the cold water, he continues to be lazy. But suppose it is not a matter of indiff rence to the self, which is, we shall say, strongly imbued with stoical ideals. The conflict is the one in which the

will and two impulses are involved. The will is no longer in abeyance, but active, and decides the issue. Since the self has indentified itself with stoical ideals, and because bathing is a more stoical proceeding than slacking, we bathe. In such a case it is not necessarily the stronger impulse that wins, for the self has ranged itself on the side of the weaker impulse.[36]

It is evident then, that the will cannot be depended upon to impel to action in accordance with the ideal until it has been strengthened over a long period of time by a number of completed decisions. When the individual first conceives of identifying himslef with an ideal, and unifying his life accordingly, the implications of the ideal will not be entirely clear and the self is not completely organized by impulses which previously were gratified without question. As the unityof the self grows, however, and the implications of the ideal become more and more clear, the power of the will to motivate conduct in accordance with it grows. In fact, in many cases, it comes to choose automatically without realizing just how the decision takes place. Frequently through deliberation one alternative comes to appeal more than another,[37] sometimes without any observable change in the attractiveness of

either alternative, we simply find, after awhile, that a decision has emerged and that we now know what we are going to do.[38]

But even in the case of well integrated personalities impulse may overpower will. Professor Hadfield suggests two conditions under which this may happen. (1) When the complexes or instincts are excessively aroused, as when we are chased by a bull. In such a case the instinct is so strongly aroused by this stimulus that it overpowers the "self" which is by feebly stimulated by its ideal of courage. (2) When the stimulus of the self and will is feeble, e.g., when on holiday, there is an absense of any incentive to exert the will. This absense of an adequate ideal or stimulus to the will is characteristic of the times when we have undergone some great strain. In such times, whether of fear, of grief, of failure, or of fatigue of war, our self is weary and powerless to make an effort, and tends to become distintegrated, and our actions are left to the mercy of our impulses.[39]

The way out of such a difficulty seems to show itself through experience, to be the organization of the self along a new line, in accordance with a new ideal or purpose. In Professor Hadfield's words, "Such disintegration may be prevented by the presentation of an ideal which has the power to

arouse the will once more, and restore the power of the self."[40]

In summary we may say that the will is the factor of choosing and integrating and motivating the personality in accordance with a unified ideal. Its power to drive to action grows with its ability to choose along unified lines. Sometimes it dominates action; sometimes impulses over-rule it. This depends on whether the self or the impulses are more strongly stimulated[41] and on the habits of willful action that have been built up in the past in accordance with a unified purpose.

Any student of nature cannot but be struck by the profusion with which she sows. For every seed that grows to maturity there are hundreds scattered about. She is just as prodigal with the ideals and ideas that play upon our consciousness every day. It has been noted how will acts as a selective agent and chooses the ideal which it will drive through into conduct. But what about the many that are not chosen? What of those mental pictures of ourselves in situations we are never able to meet? What of the repelled desires or impulses that we fight down in making a decision in accordance with the more unified self?

These questions are important, for, while

this thesis is primarily concerned with these ideals which should make for action, and why they either do or do not, it will be seen that there is a distinct place in the personality of any individual for some of these which are not completed in this way.

In answer to the question "What becomes of the rejected motives?", Professor Woodworth wrote,

> "If unimportant and superficial, they simply lapse into an inactive state and are gradually forgotten, perhaps recurring to mind once in a while with a faint tinge of regret, since after all we should have liked to gratify them... When a motive is deeply rooted in our nature, it cannot be so easily eliminated. Sometimes it is simply deferred and remains dormant, content to lie and bide its time....Sometimes it is disguised and then gratified, as when an apparently courteous deed contains an element of spite. Sometimes it is afforded a substitute gratification, as when the boastful boy, after having his conceit taken out of him by his mates, boasts of his school, profession, town or country. This is often called "sublimation". Sometimes, though denied, it remains insistent, and "defense mechanisms" have to be devised to keep it down; the"sour grapes" mechanism is an example, which may be used not only when the "grapes" are physically out of reach but also when for any reason we decide to leave them alone." 42

If rejected ideals of one course of conduct or another result in such a complex as was suggested in the latter part of this paragraph, they may act as a severe handicap in the promotion of new and higher ideals. For strenth of will to drive an ideal

through depends on unity of purpose and a coordinated self as has alreday been shown, and inadequate suppression and unhealthy sublimation of ungratified desires tn t continually assert themselves will make for lack of unity and disintegration of a life which ideally should be organized in relat on to a definite goal. In such a case the whole background that makes the realization of ideals on the higher plane possible, is broken down.

> "The psychoanalytic school lays great stress on "suppressed" lesires," Professor Woodworth continues, "holding that they find gratification symbolically in dreams, and at times break into life in a disturbing way.
> The most adequate way of handling rejected motives is to coordinate them with other, accepted motives...to harness them into teams and put them to work. This cannot always be done; for example, if a young woman has two attractive suitors, she might find it difficult to harness them together, and will have to say good-by to one of them, at least. But when the boastful boy becomes a loyal and enthusiastic member of a school, his self-assertion is harnessed up with social motives into a very effective team. Probably a tendency can only be properly "sublimated" oy being thus combined and coordinated with other strong tendencies." 43

Since acceptance and practice of an ideal is not often a sudden transforming experience, but more often a slow growing process involving many conditioning factors, this is an important thing

for religious leaders everywhere to take into consideration as they work. Our task is not only that of winning adherence to the highest ideals, but to help the individuals who are striving to put them into practice to repress or coordinate their old urges along the line of their new purpose.

Now what of the mental pictures of ourselves in situations we are never liable to experience? An example of such an idea would be my imagining myself with Kagawa in Japan; caring for half-starved babies, talking with thieves, promoting national movements for bettering the conditions of the poor. Another type would be a lonely girl who imagines herself in a lovely room, beautifully dressed and surrounded by suitors. Her ideal image of the situation may take in the exact words they are saying to her, and her response to their different approaches. Still another example is the author who, by putting ideas together in new combinations extends his mental life into regions untouched by his personal concrete experiences. In this way he creates a plot or an ordinary man weaves a day dream.[44] The only difference between the two is that the author weaves his around a plot or purpose for a story or book, while the ordinary man simply places himself momentarily in a new situation.

Neither directly affects the behavior of the person imagining these scenes.

It is sometimes held that thought, or ideation, which fails to affect our behavior in a clean, tangible manner is fairly useless. The ideas of astronomers in regard to the position of the heavenly bodies result in guides for navigators to follow in the sailing of ships. But not all ideas that astronomers have in regard to the planets and the stars have such practical consequences. Many of these ideas have to do simply with the colossal magnitude of the universe and the relative insignificance of this little earth of ours. Such ideas carry men out of the humdrum monotony of his everyday life and broaden his intellectual horizon. They may not lengthen his life or increase his worldly goods; they maynot alter his daily conduct in a way anyone can observe; but they are capable of giving his experience a depth and perspective which make life more worth living.[45]

In just the same way my ideal of myself working beside Kagawa broadens my horizon and increases my appreciation of the work he is doing, and makes life more of a pleasure for me because of the fresh realization I have of his effort in behalf of universal human betterment. The lonely girl also

broadens her experience and the ordinary day-dreamer his.

There is danger that the satisfaction derived from such mental projectitions may bcome a substitute for the joy of action and accomplishment. It is the belief of some that education for character is being carried on in this category; that we know war is futile and that there is no need of people going hungry in our country, and we mentally picture a society in which such things will not happen. But we sit placidly and do nothing about it. If this is true, if this is happening in the above category of our lives or in any other, a normal, harmless, satisfaction has become a dangerous thwart to progress. When a mental ideal becomes a substitute for action instead of a spur to action it is unhealthy and needs to be eliminated or given new impetus.

But how? It may come through the devotion of ourselves to a challenging ideal which will require doing something about such existing evils such as those mentioned in the preceeding paragraph just as the man in a previous illustration got the impetus to bathe through adherence to the stoical ideal. Religion is constantly re-enhancing its conception of God to meet just such a need, and every new crisis finds God re-interpreted to

meet the challenge. So fresh devotion to God as demanding adherence to a particular ideal would do it.

Such an ideal as that of a country in which no one goes hungry is a very general ideal; it needs particularizing. If we would help to bring that ideal about we must find some special instance in which we can help. We must solve the problem in our own community, neighborhood or city. By particularizing it to a given situation in this way we get it out of the clouds and down where we can do something about it.

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCE OF HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT ON THE FORMATION OF IDEALS

The margin of influences conditioning ideals pushes farther and farther back as we move. From the individual and the processes of mind which determine ideals for him and promote them to action, we turn to influences outside the self (the environment) and determiners over which the individual has no control (heredity). Does every person have the natural capacity to project past experiences into new, imaginary situations and to solve problems through symbols and images? Are all of us able to coordinate our ideals around a purpose and strengthen our wills to a point of dependability? Are ideal character or behavior traits inherited from the father by the son? To what extent does the physical heritage color the formation of ideals? In how far is one's environment a determiner?

Esther Richards makes behavior, ideal or otherwise, dependent upon two factors: (1) The stuff out of which he is made; (2) The way in which environment and tr ining...of home and school and neighborhood and church...have moulded that stuff.[46]

Our previous study has led us to believe that the individual himself could do a great deal about building his own character, but if there is anything in this it seems important first of all to clear exactly what characteristics which influence the formation of ideals and character are inherited, and second to answer as definitely as possible the question "Are character traits hereditary?"

Scientists are not willing to make many definite assertions about heredity. The more they study the subject, the less ready they are to give pronouncements.[47] There are some parts of our make-up, however, which we can be certain are transmitted from one person to another through hereditary channels, and these are our definite physical characteristics such as height, color of eyes, build, etc. One of the first things in an embryo to make a recognizable appearance is the beginning of the nervous system, and since it is this part of our organism that has more to do with mind than any other, it is the one in which we are most interested.

Our nervous system has its center of control in the brain and the spinal column. Roughly the spinal cord regulates the simple, automatic reflexes such as when light strikes the eye and the pupil contracts or when food is placed in the mouth

and one initiates the act of swallowing, or when ones foot is tickled and drawn back; the medula is responsible for breathing, and to some extent the distribution of the blood; the cerebellum coordinates the muscular movements; the cortex is the portion most often associated with conscious experience. This cannot be taken too literally as stimulae interact between all these divisions in a very complex manner, but the relative importance of them to each one of the processes mentioned has been determined by experiment. For instance it has been found that if a certain cortical zone is impaired, memory is obliterated.[48]

In addition to these functions there is a large group of complex activities included as part of the original equipment, and known as instincts.[49] These instincts rest upon the presence in the nervous system of native pathways for the discharge of impulses into the muscles. Some appear at birth such as the sucking instinct of an infant, and some, like the sex instinct, come to perfection at later stages.[50] They are more complex in form than the simple reflexes, and give the orgainism capacity to meet many of the more important situations to which it must adjust itself.[51] Professor Angell makes clear in how far they affect ideals and conduct when he says,

> "In the human being they form the foundations upon which is built all that individualistic adjustment represented by his personal experience. Not only does the human child begin his life career with a capital made up solely of these herediatry achievements; they remain throughout his life as dominating factors from which he derives the larger part of his more enduring motives." 52

Professor Hadfield makes it even stronger:

> "The instincts constitute the raw material out of which our lives and characters are built, the talents which are given us, useless in themselves, but useful in the purposes to which they may be devoted. Being charged with emotional energy, they are dynamic forces which not only give strength to the passions but power to the will." 53

In the previous chapter we noted that individual interests acted as a selective agent in determining which stimulae should carry through and which should be discarded. It is in these instincts that we find a basis for such individual interests.

Since it is the attempt of education, whether religious or secular, to utilize, train and curb these endowments[54] it is important to know exactly what these instincts are. Different psychologists make different classifications of varying length and inclusiveness. Thorndike's list is as enlightening as any and much longer than most. It is sufficient to mention his three main divisions. (1) Food getting and protective responses. (2) Responses to behavior

of other human beings, and (3) Minor bodily movements and cerebral connections.

These facts would indicate that character is not inherited. Character is these inherent potentialities in action in relation to a certain situation, and it is left for environment to determine what the situation is to be and what will cause instincts to express themselves in just the way they do. In just what way environment will do this will be shown later.

Never-the-less when we recall the importance of rapid responses in making decisions, the necessity of memory to make selection of ideas and ideals possible, and the natural tendency of the selection of response to stimulae to follow interests, all of which we have seen to be determined to a marked degree by native capacity, we are tempted to feel that character is pre-determined to too great an extent to merit all the effort put forth to develop and change it. The picture is not as dark as it appears at first, however, when it is observed from every angle.

The difference between individuals comes in how much they have of a certain capacity, not in how many capacities they have. One thing we can depend upon, and that is that all humans have the

reflexes, instincts, and capacities; all have the powers of perception, discrimination, attentiveness, retentiveness, reasoning, and so forth. One characteristic is stronger in one person, another finds unusual emphasis or strength in another. According to the law of the curve we should expect to find a few universally advanced in all respects, some almost lacking in all, and all others will range somewhere between those extremes with all combinations and varying capacities. However, the difference is great enough...modern experimentation has shown it to be greater than had ever previously been thought...so that it needs constantly to be kept in mind when estimating what should be expected of people.

Heredity determines the amount of raw material that will be available for character building, but it leaves it to environment to determine how this material will be used in the construction. Man has a long period of plasticity after birth which makes environmental influences more potent in his experience than in that of the animals. For instance his emotional reactions to a given situation are not set for ten years, and, although his physical reactions may be set early in life through habit, they remain subject to change almost indef-

initely if the mind recognizes a more permanent good which necessitates a different course of action. So, while we cannot tell in just how far it is limited, the scope of hereditary is certainly bound; environment, however, is practically unbounded in the possibilities of its influence.

The characteristics of the human species which makes it possible for environment to play such an important role is the capacity of learning, particularly of imitative learning. A detailed explanation of the psychology of learning is possible were there space for it, but its significance can be realized without it.

The environment of every individual is of two distinct types, the natural and the organized. The natural types, are all those influences which are in the every day order of things... the home, playmates and all unplanned relationships; the organized environment constitutes school, Sunday school, club, summer camp or supervised play ground. These types are quite distinct, and yet there would be some overlapping such as when a parent definitely orgainzed and planned certain activities for the child.

Of these two the most complete and lasting is the natural or unorganized, unplanned environment. The studies of Hartshorne and May reveal the follow-

ing fact:

> "We would expect that the Sunday school would influence the ideals, attitudes, and opinions of children. Two of our co-workers investigated this and found that the correlation between certain Sunday school teacher's scores on the moral knowledge test and the scores of their pupils exceedingly low, indicating that the pupils idea of right and wrong held by the parents are probably rather well known to their children."[55]

According to Mr. Hartshorne to learn is to act; what is learned in and through activity is all the activity and nothing but the activity in question.[56] If this is true it is readily seen what a direct and strong influence lies in the home, for from earliest babyhood the child does what he sees his parents do, accepts the attitude he sees his father take and imitates his manners and habits about the house. The younger the child the more impressionable he is and he uncounsciously reflects the mannerisms and attitudes of his parents who almost exclusively constitute his environment.[57] Experiment and investigation is substantiating this influence to such an extent that now many symptoms and characteristics which were previously considered hereditary are in reality caused by early environmental conditions[58].

A striking example of imitation was observed at the Broad Oaks Nursery School. A little

boy came in, not more than three whom the teachers could not train to play happily with the other children. He would appear to be getting on well when suddenly he would slap or strike his playmates so hard that it brought tears. All the children in the nursery became afraid of him and he was entirely ostrasized from their play. An investigation into the home revealed the fact that the father, to show his affection for the child, played roughly with him, striking him and spanking him, so the child had come to associate that with play and a good time and carried it over into his own play life. Measures had to be taken at once to show him through very exaggerated kindness and gentleness that that was the way to play.

It is not uncommon for children to imitate actions of adults and later to be punished for it. An example is the father who goes freely to the library shelf and removes books, opens and reads them. If the child imitates him and also takes books from the library shelf he is made to understand that they are father's, and not to be touched. He then transfers that attitude to his own things, and when another child wishes to play with his toys he grasps them tightly, saying, "No, mine." He is then told he must share his toys with others. The conflict which nat-

urally grows up in the child's mind is apparent, and, while the effect is not as noticable as that in the illustration given above, it is none the less potent. What the child learns is that when you are strong enough you protect your property and when you are not you share it, which is not the joy in sharing which was intended to carry over in the toy situation. He certainly learns that there are two sides to a thing...one that his parents do as a matter of course, and another that he is expected to do.

When he gets into school he meets other conflicts which are of two sorts...the actions his teacher advocates, and those which his friends practice outside the school room. Both of these may be in contradiction to what he is used to at home. For instance his father swears at home, but he is not expected to swear; at school his teacher looks upon swearing as a great evil for anyone, but the boys he plays with consider anyone who does not swear a sissy and a prig. It is not surprizing, then, that children develop a different language and manner or standard of conduct for the home, the school and the church and the gang.

It is the purpose of organized or directed environment to meet the problems and difficulties of children and give a unity of purpose to their lives.

In a very general and superficial classification we might say that school was an attempt to prepare the child from afactual point of view to meet his environment, the Sunday school to give a unified purpose and standard of conduct, and clubs and playgrounds to help them make constructive social contacts. As a matter of fact these overlap to such an extent that we have come to think of the school as as much a center for developing creditable social conduct as the playground; the Sunday school as offering factual knowledge in a particular field as well as a unified standard for conduct.

Recently there have been strong denunciations made of what these organized agencies are accomplishing in the realm of ideal conduct. Hedley Dimock wrote in a re ent publication of "Character"[59]:

> "Individuals in contemporary life do not require the decapitation act of a drunken soldier or of a spineless Herod to separate their ideals from their work-a-day habits and conduct. That separation has been brought about by education, formal and informal, which they have received from the time of birth on."

This divorce of ideas from habits is one of the most serious aspects of contemporary American character. The extensive studies of Hartshorne and May indicate that this is not a superficial or ill grounded criticism. They discovered that children who belong to certain organizations purporting to

teach honesty deceive about the same as (and in some cases more than) children who do not belong. Furthermore, in one organization length of membership and rank achieved more positively correlated with deceptiveness. They found that while those enrolled in Protestant Sunday schools cheat less than those not enrolled, there is no relation between Sunday school attendance and deception. Children who attend regularly cheat in day school about the same as those who rarely or never attend. Their tests indicate that between children reporting affiliation with the three main religious groups, Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, and between various Protestant groups, there are no general differences which are not attributable to differences in intelligence and social level; but on certain tests the particular groups measured show real differences not thus entirely accounted for.[60]

According to their findings the natural environment has infinitely more effect upon conduct than all the organized facilities for bettering conduct put together. They found that mental capacity had a decided influence. Honesty, for instance, is positively related to intelligence. In almost any group of children of approximately the same age, those of higher levels of intelligence deceive definitely less than those of lower levels.[61] The Socio-

economic background has a decided effect. Children whose fathers are engaged in occupations yielding the higher incomes are less deceptive than children of day laborers. Children who have better home conditions...who have better manners, who are better acquainted with art and music and the influences that indicate culture and refinement, and whose parents treat them decently are less deceptive than others who do not show these refinements. Deceit is associated with such factors as parental discord, parental example, bad discipline, unsocial attitude toward children. They find that deception runs in families to about the same extent as eye color, length of forearm, and other inherited structures. This does not prove that it is inherited, but these authors believe that it inclines one to believe that, if all children received identical nurture, they would still vary in decpetion.

These tests show considerable resemblance in amount of cheating between classmates. That is, a pupil's cheating score on certain of the classroom tests is very much like that of his associates. There is a slight resemblance between friends even when they are not in the same class.

We are forced to conclude from this that the organized environment is failing miserably at

least in this one category of character experience. Whether it can justify itself by showing great advance and strength in other categories remains to be shown. We have no demonstration tests which are dependable measurements of its efficiency in the fields of social attitudes, morals, reverence for God or efficiency in work. But these tests give the best available support tothe theory that ideals in specific situations are developed only by practice. To quote from the book:

> "The results of these studies show that neither deceit nor its opposite, "honesty", are unified character traits, but rather specific functions of life situations". 63

If this is the case, generalizing on ideals as is often done in organized environment situations, has little or no effect; these agencies can help only by helping the children to develop suitable habits of conduct. Some suggestions as to how this may be done will be given later.

It is not my intention to imply that our discrepency in organized environmental influence has failed out of proportion to the extent it has succeeded. As a matter of fact without substantial data to support my opinion, I believe that these institutions made for infinitely better social relations and personal happiness than could have

otherwise been possible. It is our purpose, however, to make them function on the highest efficiency plane possible so I am giving particular attention to the reasons for failure and how to remedy them.

Mr. Dimock suggests that the reason may be partly because we are puzzled or overcome by the practical demands of complex situations, but he thinks basically our actions are unrelated to our ideals because conduct and ideals have been built up through the two separate and unrelated categories of the natural and directed environment we have been discussing.[64] That may be true, but I think it goes deeper than that. The Hartshorne and May tests showed a definite correlation between good parental control and background and honest conduct. These two forces seemed to overbalance the influence of friends where the positive correlation was slight. If this is true in this type of experience it is probably true in other types as well. Then the lack of unified conduct can most likely be traced back to the adult leaders who, because of the complex situation in which they find themselves, are unable to establish a unified standard of conduct for all situations.

This may be due in large measure to the lack of a unifying principle in our civilization,

in our education, in our philosophy and in a large measure in our religion. Religion has held on to a sense of unity better than any other organized group, and religious education is now turning to a new emphasis on God as a unifying center for our living.

In a book entitled "Exploring Religion With Eight Year Olds", Helen Firman Sweet and Sophia Lyon Fahs sum up the value of their year's work by saying:

> "At the close of the story hour one Sunday morning, Robert begged the teacher to continue telling him more about early life. "I like this so much better than school", he said. "I like it, too," said Jean, "only we don't learn as much here as we do at school." Robert went on to say that the reason he liked the Sunday school better was that the teacher put everything together in such a different way.
>
> Through this brief discussion the children showed that they had quite unwittingly discovered the very element that, from the point of view of the teacher, makes religious education unique; namely, the endeavor to see life in its totality, in terms of relationships rather than in terms of isolated facts, such as those of history or of geography. The child who said she didn't learn as much here as at school was right in the sense that she probably did not learn as much factual knowledge, but Robert put his finger on the important element, which is the learning to see life in its "togetherness" with all the myriad relationships of life fitting together to make a harmony". 65

It is just at this point in my opinion, that directed environment has failed and this, in an ultimate analysis, is the reason for the estrangement of ideals and conduct. There cannot be consistent behavior without a standard, and modern leaders have failed to give the lay educator a principle of unity which could integrate the complex experiences of this swift moving civilization.

Volumes have been written on methods in Religious Education, and every other type of organized education. It is superfulus to go into this field in any detail here except to point out some definite directions along which such methods should move.

We will remember that persons learn just what they do, what they practice, and not what they hear or are told, so we will help those under our direction to practice social responsibility, cooperation, and honesty in specific situations.[66]

Second we will attempt to make our "curriculum" a progressive series of experiences in social living. We will not mitigate the value of words, but we will use fewer of them in relation to the amount of practice we give children.[67]

Third we will utilize as allies all the forces in the life of the individual which influence

his attitudes, values, and habits most strongly by working through the grouping or associations which are most vital to the individual and from which he most seeks approval.[68]

Fourth we will find ways of bringing under effective controls those influences in the community which run directly counter to the good life, and attempt to bring the young child up in an environment most conducive to his best growth.[69]

But fifth, and more important than all these we will remember that there are ideals which are not directly transferable to conduct which are capable of giving experience, depth and perspective to the personality,[70] and may influence the whole trend of his choices and interests. We will give our children an ideal of a loving, all powerful God in accordance with whose character all acts and ideas must be in harmony. While "doing" may be important in the process of learning to realize ideals in conduct, so is faith in the importance of that ideal as part of a good and infinite plan.

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